Why is there provision in the Agreement for the use of conversion and enrichment facilities outside of IAEA safeguards?
Under the previous (1990) agreement there was no requirement for IAEA safeguards to apply to any facility (e.g. conversion or enrichment facilities) processing Australian uranium, provided the processed product was transferred out of Russia “expeditiously” and any remaining processing tails or waste was placed under safeguards arrangements. The new Agreement strengthens considerably safeguards provisions contained in the previous agreement by providing for a direct substitution approach (see following question for more details) similar to that contained in the Australia-China Nuclear Transfer Agreement. In the case of conversion facilities, such facilities are considered to be before the “starting point” for IAEA safeguards procedures as set out in the IAEA’s safeguards agreements with nuclear-weapon states. In the case of enrichment facilities, there is a unique circumstance that applies to Russia related to longstanding contracts. Russia wished to retain in the new Agreement its righ
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