Why cognitive ethology?
Many models in ethology and behavioral ecology presuppose cognition. Thus, it would be useful to have informed ideas about the types of knowledge that nonhumans might have about their social and nonsocial environments and how they use this information. Two important questions need to be given serious attention. These are “What is gained by appealing to the possibility of cognitive explanations?” and “What is lost by dismissing the possibility of cognitive explanations?” It seems clear that we would lose a lot of information about the possible richness of animals’ lives if we ignored the possibilities that they behaved intentionally at least on some occasions. Even if we discover that some animals do not appear “all that cognitive,” this does not mean that they are not cognitive at all (Bekoff, 1994). What are some reasons for advocating cognitive ethological analyses and intentional or representational explanations of animal behavior? As Watanabe, Lea, and Dittrich (1993, p. 372) state
