Who would get Gains from EUs Quantity Restraint on Emissions Trading in the Kyoto Protocol?
Y. Kaino, T. Saijo and T. Yamato ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University Abstract: The EU proposal on the quantity restraint of the emissions trading in the Kyoto Protocol aims at reducing the so called hot air that would be generated by the purchase of emissions permits sold by a country whose actual emissions are much lower than the assigned amount. In this paper we show that no quantity restraint of all demanders is not a subgame perfect equilibrium, but quantity restraints with a least one country constitute the equilibria. Keywords: EXPERIMENTS; ENVIRONMENT; NATURAL RESOURCES (search for similar items in EconPapers) JEL-codes: C92 Q31 Q38 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Date: 2000 View list of references Track citations by RSS feed Downloads: (external link) http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2000/dp0493.pdf Related works: This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.