Who Benefits From Corroding Keiretsu?
Author InfoTohru Wako Hiroshi Ohta Abstract Observations on Japan’s industrial distribution system reveal that many producers maintain both keiretsu and non-keiretsu channels. An intriguing question then is: what economic rationale underlies such an ambivalent policy? This motivated us to present a model of an incomplete keiretsu system. We find that the collapse of a keiretsu is not necessarily a misfortune for the firms remaining therein: they can turn the situation to their advantage if a keiretsu collapses partially. We show why some firms leave their keiretsu while others remain with it, and determine who the winners are. Copyright 2005 Blackwell Publishing Ltd Download InfoTo download: If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient
