Which is the lesser of two evils–nuclear proliferation or the extension of more concrete American nuclear assurances?
India is likely to pose this issue. It has a nuclear capability, fears the Chinese and is very reluctant to sign the NPT. The obligations of the nuclear powers toward non-nuclear signatories of the NPT are imprecise. While suggesting their importance to countries like India we stressed their unimportance to Senators like Fulbright. Indian nationalism and the Chinese threat could induce New Delhi to demand from us (and the Soviets) much more explicit nuclear assurances as the price of nuclear abstention. We would have to choose between our objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and non-proliferation of U.S. “commitments”. Japan is the other prime nuclear candidate in Asia–it too is on the nuclear threshold and has been slow to sign the NPT. Unlike the Indian case, we cannot be much more explicit in our nuclear assurances for Japan. If it inclines towards the nuclear club it will mean that it is shedding its unique nuclear aversion and it prefers to assume its own defense ag
