When is Neural Plasticity a Case of Multiple Realizability?
The outcome of the previous section is this. There is a vagueness common to function ascriptions that raises difficulties for at least some claims of multiple realizability. The claim that realization1 and realization2 are both realizations of kind X might very well depend on some judgment call about whether realization1 and realization2 do in fact have the same function. Secondly, even granting that two realizations are realizations of the same functional kind, a judgment that they are different kinds of realizations requires attention to the properties by which they perform their function. It is now time to put these observations to work in an effort to evaluate whether neural plasticity is really the existence proof for multiple realizability that philosophers so often take it to be. One very prominent sense of neural plasticity involves the ability of the brain to change as a result of experience. The brain of a violin player or a person proficient with Braille will differ in predi
