When Are Stable Rights to Rents Bad?
Author Info Sutter, Daniel Abstract Stable, enforceable property rights over resources normally furthers economic efficiency. The author argues that stable rights to government created rents and wealth transfers, by contrast, generate inefficiency. Secure rights to receive transfers increases rent-seekers’ incentive to make political investments creating new transfers. The author demonstrates the point using a two period rent-seeking game. Contestable transfers reduce the probability of establishing a transfer program and aggregate rent-seeking expenditures. Strengthening transfer recipients’ rights increases the difficulty of eliminating a transfer program. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers Download InfoTo download: If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not
