What were the six safety recommendations recommended as a result of the June 2005 incident?
The first recommendation was that Metro should evaluate the track circuit design to determine the extent to which current and future designs can be modified to prevent a recurrence of that type of failure. This was done. Changes were made to our standard specification to improve the physical separation between cables of audio frequency track circuits. The second and third recommendations were that Metro should continue to monitor track circuit behavior and formalize the process. To implement these recommendations, Metro created the computerized tool for detecting loss of shunt incidents, or incidents in which a train is not detected. Metro also created the computerized tool for detecting loss of shunt incidents, or incidents in which a train is not detected. The tool was used weekly to monitor track circuit performance for one year. As the tool had not identified any serious problems in that time, it seemed reasonable to use the tool monthly after July 2006. Since the June 22, 2009 acc