What Should a Theory of Epistemic Justification Tell Us?
A Defense of Deontologism H. Benjamin Shaeffer Humboldt State University William Alston’s claim that deontologism fails to provide an important account of epistemic justification either begs the question or assumes that deontologism ought to provide the conditions under which subjects operating in ordinary circumstances would be epistemically rational. However, not only is Alston’s assumption ad hoc, but it threatens the autonomy of epistemology from other disciplines such as ethics, practical reasoning, and aesthetics. Instead, deontologism should describe the conditions under which an ‘ideal’ subject is epistemically rational. Such a theory is immune to the criticisms Alston levels against deontologism.
Related Questions
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- How Successful is Harts hybrid justification theory of punishment?
- What Should a Theory of Epistemic Justification Tell Us?
