What is the De Jure Question?
Plantinga next asks a “metaquestion” which he complains is seldom asked: “precisely what question (or questions) is it that critics mean to press when they ask whether Christian and theistic belief is rational, or rationally defensible, or rationally justifiable, or whatever?” (67)[8] Three chapters are spent considering which of justification, rationality, or warrant the best de jure objection should deny of traditional Christian belief. Concerning justification Plantinga thinks that the paradigmatic meanings of “justified” and “justification” involve deontology, i.e., duties and obligations of belief. He imagines a sophisticated, contemporary Christian who is aware of objections to Christian belief, and asks whether her belief must go contrary to any duty: The answer seems to be pretty easy…. How could she possibly be blameworthy or irresponsible, if she thinks about the matter as hard as she can, in the most responsible way she can, and she still comes to these conclusions? Indeed