What are proper audits and improvements needed for the precinct-based optical scan solutions to achieve the level of the best DRE with VVPR (VVPB, VVPAT)?
• One of the urgently needed improvements is to include a visual display and/or aural reading of HOW the ballot marked and submitted is being read before actually counting them electronically. If one cannot trust what is touched and confirmed on DRE screens, how can one trust a computer that performs the complex operation of correctly converting marks in special positions on a piece of paper? • The authenticity of the marked paper ballots depends entirely on the proper handling and processing of the paper ballots after the election. It makes sense to take a picture of every marked ballot while they are being deciphered and counted. These picture images are also scrambled as required (for privacy concerns) for electronic counting of the ballots. This is as good as shooting video of the counting process. Of course, loss of privacy results due to sequencing inherent in video recording. • Ideally, there should be an “electronic tag” on the electronic picture image of the ballot and the cor
