Should the Antitrust Division, the FTC, and State Attorneys General Formally Allocate the Market for Antitrust Enforcement?
Source: Matthew Bender’s Antitrust Report (October 1998 pp. 2-6) Author: Robert M. Langer The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and state attorneys general, as any antitrust aficionado knows, have dramatically improved the level of communication, cooperation, and coordination among themselves in the investigation and prosecution of antitrust violations during the past decade.1 Two important examples of such coordination are the 1998 Protocol for Coordination in Merger Investigations Between the Federal Enforcement Agencies and State Attorneys General (“Merger Protocol”) 2 and the 1996 Protocol for Increased State Prosecution of Criminal Antitrust Offenses (“Criminal Protocol”). 3 Additionally, in 1993, the states, through the National Association of Attorneys General (“NAAG”), reissued and revised their Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 4 Although the 1993 NAAG Guidelines do not achieve complete convergence with the 1992 revisions to the DO
