Should Antitrust Assess Buyer Market Power Differently than Seller Market Power?
Comments by Marius Schwartz* Professor of Economics Georgetown University Washington DC 20057-1036 schwarm2@georgetown.edu Presented at DOJ/FTC Workshop on Merger Enforcement Washington DC February 17, 2004 I am grateful for the opportunity to participate in this Merger Enforcement Workshop. Referring to our Monopsony panel, the press release announcing the Workshop states that the Agencies seek comment on “how, if at all, they should assess the creation for buying market power differently than selling power.” In line with the Workshop’s focus, I will frame my remarks largely in the context of horizontal mergers, though many of the points apply also to assessing the formation of market power through other means, such as exclusionary conduct. I interpret “assess” to encompass two things: (a) the method of analysis, e.g., the types of information employed to predict the likely effects (such as the minimal level and changes in concentration that trigger concerns); and (b) the criteria use
