Now, armed with the given figures, it remains to answer the question: will the Russian Navy submarine fleet be up to the task of fulfilling its responsibilties by the year 2010?
The answer to this question looks like the this: The entire range of tasks currently before the submarine fleet, in addition to those it faced during the years of the USSR, could not be accomplished. Choices will have to be made, based on the absolute priority of the first three tasks consistent readiness to deliver a nuclear strike, defense of SSBNs, interception of enemy SSBNs. Based on the normal ASIPR of 0.5, for which 9 SSBNs will be constantly present at sea, their defense will require: in the Northern Fleet: 6 SSBNs in CS under the polar ice cap, with 2 SSNs in the convoy, and at least 4 SSNs defending the bastion, in position in the Faroe-Iceland passage (3) and Denmark Strait (1). Accounting for the given (rather high) ASIPR, to fulfill the remaining tasks the Northern Fleet can spare 5-6 SSNs more, and two-three more can be added for a buildup of forces during an escalation (only service NSs are considered, without reserves of any category, which could be mobilized during cri
