Is Zen Anthropocentric?
Simon P. James begins his chapter on Zen Buddhism and environmental ethics by briefly summarizing his first chapter in which he makes the argument that Zen is “neither amoral nor immoral but can be perceived in terms of virtue ethics” (58) on the grounds that there is no strict list things that should be done and should not be done, but rather the Zen Buddhist should act in a way that is in accordance to his achieving Buddhahood (within insight, compassion and good intentions). He then takes up the charge that Zen is inherently anthropocentric, responding, “it seems perfectly reasonable to hold that valuing nature non-instrumentally-that is, valuing it for its own sake rather than for its usefulness- is constitutive of human excellence” (60). In support of supposition, he draws on Aristotle’s views on friendship and caring for fiends for their sake(60). James also notes that the Buddhist’s “cultivation of self takes the form of a decentering of the self and a concern for a wider networ