Is the Revival of Mind-body Identity Theory Possible?
Jack Yang, National Yang Ming University Allen Houng, National Yang Ming University yuanjackyang@gmail.com Sunday, June 7th, 17:30–19:30: Poster No. 52 One of the most remarkable objections to the classic mind-brain identity theory, proposed by Place and Smart, is Saul Kripke’s modal argument. Most materialists will reply by denying that the entailment from conceivability to metaphysical possibility is false. But this essay is an attempt to make a new way out for the identity theory from a different approach without discarding theory of rigid designator and ontological commitment on which Kripke is based. Thus, I will explain away conceivability of mind-body separability. First, I will reject Kripke’s premise that the confusion between heat -reality- and sensation of heat –appearance- is analogically the only source of Cartesian intuition of separating mind-body. Instead, a new source of apparent conceivability, between pain and C-fiber firing, can be discovered and extinguished so tha
