Is “Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt” a Self-Defining Concept?
Abstract With its fundamental decision In re Winship (1970) the United States Supreme Court set the constitutional basis of the standard of persuasion in criminal trials. The long standing standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was selected by the Court as the bedrock that protects the values at stake in a criminal case. Soon after this decision a dispute started between scholars and between Courts on whether the reasonable doubt standard ought to be defined by jury instructions or could be considered a matter of the jurors original understanding, that is a self-evident concept. Depending on the solution of the dispute, failing to define the standard through a suitable instruction could amount to a reversible constitutional error ( i.e. a constitutional error that imposes reversal). In 2006 the highly discussed law n.46 introduced in the Italian Criminal Procedure Code the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt ( prova al di l di ogni ragionevole dubbio). The law does not def
