is physical cognition a domain-general ability in corvids?
Nathan Emery (Queen Mary University of London and University of Cambridge) Venue: RIDB 165 Date: 21st October 2008 Time: 16:00 – 17:00 A flexible, domain-general intelligence is said to be an important part of human cognitive uniqueness. By contrast, the cognitive abilities of non-human animals are thought to be adaptive specializations, restricted to solving domain-specific problems. For example, only social species can read the Behaviour of conspecifics and only tool users can represent the functions of tools. In this talk, I will discuss a number of physical cognition experiments in rooks, a non-tool-using member of the crow family, that test their cognitive flexibility and spontaneity in relation to the perception of object properties, causal reasoning, tool use, functional tool choice, tool modification, metatool use and creative tool manufacture. I will discuss the results in relation to those from similar tests on New Caledonian crows that habitually make tools, and suggest an e
