Is Explanation a Necessary Condition for Justification?
The final objection to the explanatory coherence theory does not depend on the sweeping analysis of explanatory coherence itself. Lehrer tries to drive a wedge between explanation and justification, claiming that explanation is not a necessary condition for justification. There are some cases in which what justifies us explains nothing. The Pythagorean theorem may justify my belief that there is an owl five feet from a mouse, since the owl sits on a flagpole four feet high and the mouse is three feet from its base. But it does not explain why the mouse is five feet from the owl, since owls eat mice. There is no explanatory coherence here, but there is justification. The present use of this case, which was originally proposed as a counter-example to a logical analysis of explanation, is not convincing. Given that owls eat mice, I should be suspicious of the information that there is an owl five feet from a mouse. The predator/prey relation gives me reason to doubt that the situation is
