Is a Universal Regularity Theory an Adequate Account of Laws of Nature?
We all seem to have, as Hempel points out, an instinctive idea of what a ‘law’ is – we seem to understand the forms they take, and what use they can be put to – but as with any concept where our intuitions predate a clear definition of the concept, we will have a somewhat difficult time pinning down exactly what qualifies as a law. I shall begin by attempting to show that a regularity theory of laws fits well with our intuitions and will be more useful than a denial of laws altogether. I shall then discuss the problem of ‘accidental truths’, and look at theories that attempt to avoid the difficulties posed by these; then I will briefly look at ‘gruesome’ predicates, and try to show why, whilst they may be a problem for induction, they pose less difficulty for the formulation of laws. Finally I shall put forward my rather stricter conception of laws, which denies definitional truths as laws. The classic example of a law of nature (presumably because it is now so commonly accepted as hol
