If Chinese conversion facilities are not open for inspection, how can we be sure that Australian uranium will not be diverted for military purposes?
China has agreed to use AONM only at nuclear facilities covered by its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. However, uranium conversion facilities are before the “starting point” for IAEA safeguards procedures and are not included in IAEA safeguards agreements with nuclear weapon states. In accordance with long-standing international principles of accounting for nuclear material, on receipt of AONM (yellowcake) in China an equivalent quantity of converted natural uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride will be added to the inventory of a facility designated for safeguards – e.g. an enrichment plant. This will have exactly the same effect as if the yellowcake had moved through the conversion plant, and will ensure that after receipt in China, AONM remains in a facility designated for safeguards and listed under the agreement at all times.
Related Questions
- If Chinese conversion facilities are not open for inspection, how can we be sure that Australian uranium will not be diverted for military purposes?
- Won’t supply of Australian uranium free-up Russia’s own uranium for military use?
- How can we be sure that Australian uranium would be properly secured in Russia?
