How would the new international order help deal with Irans nuclear program?
The most dangerous point for North Korea, where [that country] developed its nuclear weapon, was when it was not under international supervision between 2005 and October of 2006. Breaking off diplomatic contact and not having access by the [International Atomic Energy Agency] is worse for our long-term interests than it is to have that kind of engagement. With Iran, some of the key elements include reaffirmation and clarity on offers for access to enriched fuel and potentially working with partners such as Russia on fuel enrichment offshore, mechanisms for dealing with the reprocessing of spent fuel that can take it off shore, a validation that we support an Iranian civilian nuclear program within the context of international supervision, and, if we can complement that then with the beginnings of a discussion with Iran on how if it steps away from support for terrorist activities, it could be incorporated into a wider regional framework.
