How does the Open Voting System deal with issues of security, resiliency, integrity, and reliability?
The Open Voting System is designed to deal with both intentional and accidental abuse from the outside and also to try to minimize or eliminate the effects of internal failures or errors. The paper ballot produced by the Open Voting System is one of the core elements. The paper ballot, because it can be read by the voter represents a solid backstop against undetectable tampering of the machines through which the voter makes his or her selections. Similarly, the paper ballot is an archival quality document that can be examined at a later date to validate that the vote counting mechanisms performed accurately. The Open Voting System, because it is based on open source software, can be inspected and tested by those who are skeptical by nature or those who are empowered to certify the system. Moreover, because the system is open source, third parties or voters who might be suspicious of tampering are able to independently validate ballots and vote tallies. For example, one of the types of
