How does the exemption clause defer to state post-conviction determinations?
Logan argues that the “restoration-of-rights” exemption clause defers to a state’s determination that a person is trustworthy enough to possess firearms. Id. at 7. The state indicates such a determination by choosing not to deprive a defendant of his civil rights, or by bestowing an expungement, set aside, pardon, or restoration of civil rights. Id. Logan argues that the inquiry should focus on whether a person possesses civil rights subsequent to conviction, rather than how such a person obtains his civil rights. Id. at 7-8; see Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1998). In Caron, the Court acknowledged that although a convict’s right to vote had never been taken away, his civil rights should be considered “restored” because he possessed all three rights after conviction. Logan urges, therefore, that there is no substantive difference between rights regained and rights retained after a conviction because “[b]oth are means to the same end.” Brief of Petitioner at 15. Logan em
