How does the concept of language games really function in Wittgenstein’s philosophy?
PDRTJS_settings_87365_post_29 = { “id” : “87365”, “unique_id” : “wp-post-29”, “title” : “How+does+the+concept+of+language+games+really+function+in+Wittgenstein%27s+philosophy%3F”, “item_id” : “_post_29”, “permalink” : “http%3A%2F%2Fdprice218.wordpress.com%2F2007%2F07%2F18%2Fhow-does-the-concept-of-language-games-really-function-in-wittgensteins-philosophy%2F” } My experience reading Wittgenstein’s various descriptions of the significance of “language games” with respect to meaning can be summed up as…well….confused. On one level, the connection between a game and meaning can be made painlessly. We don’t know what a game is in the sense that we don’t know what exactly makes something a game. Our definition can’t do the work we’d like us to. What is a game? Obviously, we can try to give sense to it. The following are quick examples of “attempts to make sense of the meaning of ‘to game’ or ‘to be a game’” (no dictionaries to be used for our purposes here): “Well, it’s something–a sort of
