How does the 1993 debacle in Somalia explain the current intervention situation?
When the first Bush administration got involved in Somalia, it was a very limited use of American military force. It was humanitarian intervention, but it was designed to keep people alive — not to fix, much less solve, the political problems of Somalia. Gradually, then, under the Clinton administration, the policy evolved. I’m not sure a decision was made, so much as it simply happened, and increasingly we found ourselves going after political figures in Somalia — ultimately [warlord Mohamed Farrah] Aidid — to try to, in some way, break the back of the political opposition. The problem, I would say, was we took on a more ambitious mission. We went from a narrow, humanitarian mission to a form of peacemaking; we didn’t put the right kinds of forces, or enough forces, into it; and we got into trouble. When we got into trouble and lost nearly 20 lives, the administration simply decided it wasn’t worth staying and the American people wouldn’t support it. I don’t know if that was the ri
