How do Secondary Factors and Constitutional Concerns Affect the Interpretation of § 924(c)?
O’Brien contends that the secondary factors other than language and structure which influenced the Court’s interpretation of § 924(c) in Castillo have not changed since that decision. See Brief for O’Brien at 24. First, O’Brien argues that determining what type of weapon was used during the commission of a crime has traditionally been an element of the offense. See id. at 25. O’Brien also contends that the thirty-year mandatory minimum sentence for possession of an automatic weapon is so severe that it favors treating such possession as a separate element of the crime. See id. at 27. Additionally, O’Brien argues that the lack of explicit legislative intent to transform the provision into a sentencing factor indicates that the interpretation should not change either. See id .at 28-29. The United States maintains that secondary factors do not clearly favor O’Brien’s interpretation of § 924(c). See Brief for United States at 21. The United States argues that prior to the 1998 revision, fe