Having achieved the rapprochement, what was the principal advantage that that brought to United States foreign policy?
HK: Well, it set up a triangular relationship between Russia, the United States and China, in which we attempted to be closer to each of them than they were to each other so we could calibrate our policy in relation to specific crises that arose in relation to our national interests. It also gave us much greater flexibility in relationship with other Asian nations that were under the shadow of China. INT: How did Moscow take it? HK: My experience with Moscow is that whenever one makes a dramatic move, one is told that this will antagonize the Soviet Union forever and in my experience the opposite has always happened: they have always adjusted and tried to encompass the new reality in their own diplomacy – which incidentally is usually quite skilful. So the Moscow reaction was that the summit which we had tried to achieve before the trip to China, and in which they had been stonewalling us and tried to use to … well, to put it kindly, blackmail us into untoward concessions, or concess
