Does worker rights conditionality protect American workers?
If protection from labor-intensive imports was the only motivation behind the push for a trade-labor linkage, one might expect to observe one of two responses to the worker rights conditionality in GSP: Because the program is relatively small after all the exclusions, it might not attract much attention from unions or other “disguised protectionists.” To the extent there is activity on this issue, one would expect a protectionist motivation to result in disproportionate targeting of the largest and heaviest users of the program. The numerous limitations on access to GSP benefits are intended to reduce the impact on import-sensitive sectors in the United States and this no doubt helps dissipate potential protectionist pressures. In the 1990s, total imports from BDCs as a share of total US imports averaged only around 15 percent while duty-free imports under GSP were only 2-3 percent (table 3). Thus, the impact of GSP on the US economy is quite small, thereby reducing motives to manipula
