Does Public Good Provision Determine Incumbent’s Fate?
Saumik Paul and Arthur Denzau MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Abstract: In this paper we empirically examine whether public facilities like providing primary school, medical clinics, electricity etc help incumbents to stay in power. Specifically, we analyze the parliamentary election outcomes in 483 constituents in rural India from 1971 to 1991. This study is based on a simple voter model where the voter looks at the supply of public goods provided by the incumbent and then decides whether to re-elect the incumbent. We find empirical evidence that voters do significantly care about educational, electricity and communication facilities, whereas incumbents face defeat if they provide more medical or safe drinking water facilities. Keywords: Election and voting behavior; performance of government; public good; inter-jurisdictional differential and their effect; India (search for similar items in EconPapers) JEL-codes: H11 H41 D72 H73 (search for similar items in Econ
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