Does Leibniz disallow freedom?
One of the first objections of Arnauld upon reading Leibniz’s philosophy was his worry that it disallowed freedom, both for man and God. Leibniz claimed that freedom was consistent with his philosophy, and did so vehemently till his death. This question raises fundamental questions concerning Leibniz’s philosophy, and in this investigation it shall be seen if it is somehow possible to arrive at a form of compromise between traditional views of freedom, and Leibniz’s philosophy. The structure of this examination of Leibniz will take this form – Firstly a brief outline of Leibniz’s argument concerning pre-determination, then an analysis of the objections at each point, starting with objections against Leibniz’s apparent contradictions with freedom, and then back through his arguments until the fundamental problems surface. Leibniz’s philosophy centres around the idea of the monad – self-contained subjects, which contain within them all of their predicates. If a subject contains within it
