Does IRV address the “spoiler” problem as well as separate runoff elections do?
Yes, but better. IRV solves the spoiler problem better than separate runoffs and at least as well as any alternative voting method. A “spoiler” is a negative term for a minor candidate with not chance of winning the election. Under plurality rules such “spoiler” candidacies can throw an election to a candidate the majority of voters oppose. IRV tackles the “spoiler problem” in a manner similar to a traditional two-election runoff, except that, due to its sequential elimination procedure, it is more effective at eliminating the spoiler effect. Under a traditional two-election runoff, if there are several candidates in the first round who have similar policy views, it is possible for them to split the majority in such a way that none of these similar candidates reaches the runoff round, while two candidates with substantial core support but very narrow appeal advance. Under IRV, voters who divided among these similar candidates will see their votes automatically re-unite for the stronges
