Does deontology lead to moral schizophrenia?
Let us return, for a moment, to the character of Eichmann as presented in his post-conviction comments. Let us suppose this character were entirely inverted. That is, suppose there was a Kantian deontologist who liked nothing better than to kill Jews. Suppose this man frames the maxim, “when I am having a bad day, I should kill Jews, in order to cheer myself up.” Such a maxim fails the CI-procedure. If this man took Kantian deontology seriously, he would be compelled to refrain from killing Jews in these circumstances. But this is a case of moral schizophrenia: this man wants to murder, but he feels compelled not to by his moral theory. Few would argue that schizophrenia in this situation is a defect in the morality governing his actions.[6] Any moral theory, not just deontology, but any moral theory that provides checks and curbs on an erring will will result in this sort of schizophrenia. It is a strength of moral theories that they reign in an erring will, and the fact that in these
