Does counterterrorism offer a better framework for successful intelligence collection?
A2: If executed well, yes. Good intelligence collection is about talking to the right people. In Afghanistan, this means reaching out to actors closest to Taliban leadership. Just as any law enforcement agency might target a large criminal network by registering the assistance of insiders or smaller rivals, so too should U.S., NATO, and Afghan forces identify Taliban most amenable to deal making. Such an approach could exploit the myriad tribal factions in Afghanistan, and even Pakistan, by creating internal divisions within the broader insurgency. It also might appeal to “moderate” militants, many of whom join extremist groups for purely financial considerations. The goal of these efforts would be to turn the Taliban against itself and draw certain elements into the Afghan government’s sphere—much like U.S. efforts at creating divisions between Iraq’s Sunni insurgents and foreign-born al Qaeda in Iraq. Talking to the right people also means further enhancing U.S. cooperation with Paki
