Do the moral evil demons pose a special problem about moral disagreement?
Is the problem that I have identified a special problem for moral belief? This is a crucial question for our discussion. Several philosophers think that we are unusually resistant to adjusting our moral beliefs in response to learning that other moral thinkers disagree with us; as these philosophers put it, it seems to them that we are much more intransigent in the face of such moral disagreement than we are in the face of other kinds of disagreement.[8] If this is right, then we must either concede that most people are irrationally overconfident in their moral beliefs, or else we must argue that there is something highly special and unusual about the epistemology of moral belief. It seems doubtful to me whether the case of moral disagreement is a special case in this way. There are many other areas of thought in which there are disagreements that are just as profoundly entrenched as moral disagreements. For example, there are some theological disagreements that do not obviously seem t
