Do the ICRA amendments violate Morris Fifth Amendment equal protection rights?
The Ninth Circuit’s direction on remand to this Court orders first that this Court determine whether Indian, as used in the 1990 amendments and ICRA statute, is a political or racial distinction. Plaintiff argues fervently that it is a racial distinction, based on the fact that some form of racial component is an element of the definition of Indian, in addition to membership in a federal tribe. Morris argues that the fact that he, a non-member Indian, is subject to CSKT tribal jursidiction, and a non-Indian, non-member is not, creates a racially-based distinction in prosecution. The United States Supreme Court explained in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), that Indian for the purpose of federal legislation is a political rather than racial designation. [FN6] As the Supreme Court explained in U.S. v. Antelope, federal regulation of Indian crimes was “rooted in the unique status of Indians as ‘a separate people’ with their own political institutions. Federal regulation of Indian tr
