Do Evil and/or Suffering Disprove Gods Existence?
The problem of evil has been a plaguing issue for theists ever since the concept of God became an object of academic discourse. It was Fyodor Dostoevsky who poignantly observed that one does not question God who is in many ways beyond comprehension, but the world that He created. However, the two versions of the problem of evil do not sufficiently render theism either impossible or improbable. First, the logical problem of evil seeks to diminish the possibility of God’s existence via logical incompatibility. But it is possible that God has morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil. Say, maybe God allows certain evils in order to bring about a greater good. If this is at least possible then the existence of God and the existence of evil are not logically incompatible after all. Secondly, the inferential/probabilistic/evidential problem of evil is more modest because it denies the likelihood of God’s existence given that there may be better solutions to the amount of evil in the act
