Do congressional leaders detect and deter cartel cheating?
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under “Related research” (further below) or search for a different version of it. Publisher InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economics of Governance. Volume (Year): 4 (2003) Issue (Month): 2 (08) Pages: 161-175 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:4:y:2003:i:2:p:161-175 Contact details of provider: Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10101/index.htm Order Information: Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: liame2(‘edu’,’bc’,’m7i7′,’baum’) (Christopher F Baum). Related researchKeywords: Key words: Cartels; public choice; political loyalty; congressional committees; JEL classification:D71; D72; H11; StatisticsAccess and download statistics Did