Do all systems with the same functional organization have qualitatively identical experiences?
According to Chalmers systems with the same fine-grained functional organization have identical experiences and, if the functional organization associated with consciousness is defined to be the system’s “awareness,” this controversial claim becomes more plausible. But Chalmers’ case is not simply a matter of definition. His principal argument is a thought experiment which demonstrates that systems which are functionally isomorphic could not themselves distinguish between having experiences of different kinds. Conversely, if they could make such distinctions (and noticed or reported different experiences) they would not be functionally isomorphic. However, whether functionally isomorphic systems could notice experiential differences must be distinguished from whether experiential differences in such systems exist. A totally nonconscious machine, for example, would have no way of noticing that it was totally nonconscious (the conscious/nonconscious distinction would have no meaning for
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