Can the IAEA Prevent the Diversion of Declared Material?
The IAEA’s verification system cannot physically prevent diversion of nuclear materials or the setting up of an undeclared or clandestine nuclear weapons programme. Under its current mandate, the IAEA acts not as an executive force but as an inspection, detection and alarm mechanism. It can neither force countries to sign the NPT or similar treaties, nor can it prevent a country from withdrawing from such treaties and IAEA membership. Moreover, the IAEA cannot prevent States which have signed only INFClRC/66/Rev.2 agreements from building and operating unsafeguarded facilities. The ability of the safeguards system to detect diversion of declared material or the existence of clandestine nuclear activities is limited by technical considerations, by the resources made available by the IAEA Member States and by the extent of the verification which States are prepared to accept. The IAEA aims to have a high level of assurance that the safeguards system in a non-nuclear weapon State would de
Related Questions
- Why does the NRC consider the current requirements inadequate for GLDs that contain quantities of radioactive material above 1/10 of the IAEA’s Category 3 threshold values?
- Why is the NRC using IAEA values to limit the quantity of byproduct material in a GL device?
- Can the IAEA Prevent the Diversion of Declared Material?
