Can economics and rational choice theory be of value even if they are predictively empty?
Some thinkers have held that rational choice models like those in economics are of value regardless of their predictive worth. In his often-cited essay, “Rational Fools,” Amartya Sen asks why Edgeworth portrays individuals in his economics as self-interested, despite believing that individuals are not in fact always self-interested. One answer is that Edgeworth believes that in particular domains (war and “contract”) individuals are, to a good approximation, self-interested (1977, p. 318). Another answer, Sen maintains, is that Edgeworth — like many other economists — is interested in the abstract question of whether egoistic behavior serves the general good (1977, pp. 319-22). General equilibrium theory answers this theoretical question (with respect to idealized circumstances). It does not matter if people are in fact egoists. From a very different perspective, Alexander Rosenberg also attempts to separate the worth of rational choice theories from the truth of their axioms concern
