Can CLS avoid becoming a metanarrative?
But Larner talks as though CLS cannot avoid becoming a metanarrative in theory. Sure, he says, its practice may avoid this modernist problem, but maybe not its theory. (Granted, he says this, in different words. He says that it is deconstrutable and I believe that it is deconstructable only if it is a metanarrative. For now, let’s suppose I’m right: Metanarratives are always subject to deconstruction, but other kinds of theories are probably not.) So, we should ask, even if Yusim is right and Goolishian and Anderson have avoided turning their theory into a metanarrative, have other people done this?How can that be avoided? As thinking therapists, how can we avoid turning CLS theory into a metanarrative. Jerry Shaffer had a useful suggestion. He suggested we avoid turning CLS into a metanarrative by treating CLS “not-knowingness” as an attitude, not as a philosophical principle. His idea, I believe, is that our “not-knowingness” is a result of an incredulity that might be caused by many
