Can a provision that is unconstitutionally vague be justified as a reasonable limit within s. 1 of the Charter?
[188] It has been suggested that if a law is unconstitutionally vague it cannot be saved by s. l. In R. v. Heywood, Cory J. stated: This court has expressed doubt about whether a violation of the right to life, liberty or security of the person, which is not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, can ever be justified, except perhaps in times of war and national emergencies (at 802). [189] In Osborne v. Canada (Treasury Board), 1991 CanLII 60 (S.C.C.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 69, Sopinka J. similarly indicated that where a law is so imprecise that it cannot be interpreted, there is no “limit prescribed by law” and no s. 1 analysis is therefore necessary (at 94-95). [190] However, in New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.) 1999 CanLII 653 (S.C.C.), (1999), 26 C.R. (5th) 203 (S.C.C.), Lamer C.J.C. suggested that s. 7 violations might be justified under s. 1. Such a justification would, however, be rare for two reasons: the rights protected are very
