Are the NSG’s guidelines sufficient to deter nuclear proliferation?
Many guidelines are decades old and some are now out of date. The NSG learned a great deal from Abdul Qadeer Khan’s clandestine nuclear proliferation network on how cheaters evade controls and some changes in the guidelines will be made in response. Other changes are necessary because technology has advanced. Would-be proliferators can now procure equipment that can help make nuclear weapons or produce fissile material but do not fall under current guidelines. Proliferators are taking advantage of the outdated guidelines and new technologies. For example, Iran recently imported pressure gauges for its uranium enrichment program that did not fall under the existing guidelines. The rule for this equipment is about 20 years old and it stipulates that items should be subject to export controls if they feature corrosion-resistant sensors made of aluminum or nickel metal or alloys. Vendors are now making nuclear-grade gauges that have sensors made of different materials and not all of the ma
