Are Hypothetical Referenda Incentive Compatible?
Author InfoCummings, Ronald G, et al Abstract Hypothetical referenda have been proposed as an incentive-compatible mechanism that can be used to obtain social valuations of environmental resources. The authors employ experimental methods to test the hypothesis that such referenda are indeed incentive compatible. Their results lead them to reject that hypothesis. Coauthors are Steven Elliott, Glenn W. Harrison, and James Murphy. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago. Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options: 1. Check below under “Related research” whether another version of this item is available online. 2. Check on the provider’s web page whether it is in fact available. 3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available. Publisher InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy. Volume (Year): 105 (1997) Issue (Month): 3 (Ju
