Are Divine Command Theory And Objective Morality Mutually Exclusive Concepts?
Luke Muelhauser confronts William Lane Craig with the inconsistency between his divine command interpretation of morality, according to which things are moral or immoral as solely determined by God’s calling them as such, on the one hand, and his insistence that in this way God is the source of “objective morality”: But let us say you are using the term ‘objective’ in a different sense than most of the moral philosophers I have read. You do clarify your meaning with an analogy about Nazis. You say that divine command theory is ‘objective’ because even if the Nazis had won WWII and brainwashed everyone into believing that anti-semitic violence was moral, it would still be true that anti-semitic violence is immoral, because it is disapproved of by God. Thus divine command theory is ‘objective.’ Perhaps you use ‘objective’ to mean something like ‘grounded in something other than the attitudes or nature of persons who are primates.’ But if so, I’m confused by an argument you give in favor
