Are computers restricted to manipulating symbols?
In [SciAm], Searle outlines his argument as follows: Axiom 1. Computer programs are formal (syntactic). Axiom 2. Human minds have mental contents (semantics). Axiom 3. Syntax by itself is neither constitutive of nor sufficient for semantics. Conclusion 1. Programs are neither constitutive of nor sufficient for minds. And this works if you accept the axioms; but in fact they’re quite dubious. Searle exemplifies one of the CR’s rules as “Take a squiggle-squiggle sign from basket number one and put it next to a squoggle-squoggle sign from basket number two.” (SciAm 26) That fits Axiom 1, all right– and note that it’s precisely the sort of rule we’d expect from a ’50s-era machine translator, one which deals with nothing but words and syntactic rules. A rule from a Schank story understander (“Open the book called ‘Restaurant procedures’ and turn to the section on waiters”) wouldn’t support Searle’s story nearly so well. The idea that computers do “symbol manipulation” is an abstraction. Co
